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INTRODUCTION
A stubborn question in tax law and policy is why some spending programs
are organized through the tax code rather than as direct outlays. Both methods
are common. For example, Social Security payments are issued directly into the
recipients' accounts.' In contrast, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), as its
name suggests, takes the form of a credit against the recipient's income tax: el-
igible beneficiaries simply owe less or are entitled to a refund when they file
their taxes.2 Social Security payments are made by the Social Security Admin-
istration.3 The EITC, like all federal tax expenditures, is handled centrally at
the IRS.'
For some tax experts, the widespread use of "tax expenditures" - policy
spending through the tax code that departs from taxing "accepted concepts of
net income"S-is concerning. The great tax scholar Stanley Surrey argued fa-
mously that one of several problems with tax expenditures is that they are a
disguised form of spending, spending that is poorly managed by Congress and
almost completely overlooked by the American people. Most tax expenditures,
wrote Surrey, "seem almost to live a life of their own, undisturbed and unex-
amined," and with "[n]o agency [that] really studies or controls them." 6 Sur-
rey concluded unhappily that this "is no way to run a tax system."7
1. See Social Security Direct Deposit, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/deposit
[http ://perma.cc/BT48-8UXR].
2. See EITC, Earned Income Tax Credit, Questions and Answers, IRS, http://www.irs.gov
/Individuals/EITC,-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit,-Questions-and-Answers [http://perma.cc
/442P-UGXT].
3. See Social Security Direct Deposit, supra note i.
4. For the EITC, see EITC Home Page, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals
/EITC-Home-Page--It%E2%8o%99s-easier-than-ever-t-find-ut-if-you-qualify-for-EITC
[http://perma.cc/W5R4-NT4R]; for a list of others, see Credits & Deductions, IRS,
http://www.irs.gov/Credits-&-Deductions [http://perma.cc/4P7P-TQV6].
s. Stanley S. Surrey & William F. Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget-Response to Professor
Bittker, 22 NAT'L TAXJ. 528, 528 (1969).
6. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 7
(1973).
7. Id. At the margins, defining what should and should not count as a tax expenditure is a dif-
ficult task. Boris Bittker argued that such labeling is not possible in a comprehensive way,
since there is no neutral baseline of "income" that can be used to identify tax expenditures.
For example, should reducing the tax bills of the disabled or unemployed count as a subsidy
for the affected classes, or simply as recognition of a reduced capacity to earn income? See
Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 8o HARv. L.
REv. 925 (1967). Nevertheless, we consider the concept useful and believe that our questions
target policies that deviate from the usual treatment under the Code. Even taking Bittker's
position, our results are still highly relevant. Bittker argued that tax policies should be con-
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In the decades since Surrey's writing on the subject, questions about the
role and value of tax expenditures have become only more relevant. While the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated many tax expenditures in the Internal Rev-
enue Code, total tax expenditures have since grown and are now more than
eight percent of GDP- $1.4 trillion in 2014.8 In the aggregate, individual in-
come tax expenditures are now larger than either defense spending or Medicare
spending.9 Yet despite the fact that academic studies of tax salience and behav-
ioral taxation have become increasingly popular, basic questions about the
public perception of tax expenditures remain largely unanswered. In particular,
many of Surrey's original concerns have avoided rigorous testing: is the true
cost of a tax expenditure really hidden or diminished by virtue of being part of
the tax code? Is it true that the public sees spending through the tax code as
different?
These questions are urgent for an additional reason. In some ways, Surrey
got his wish. Tax expenditures are subject to more oversight than ever. "Tax
expenditure budgeting," an annual process by which the federal and state gov-
ernments account for their spending through the tax code, has become the
American norm. Federal law requires the United States Treasury to produce an
annual tax expenditure budget,'0 and most states have adopted similar process-
es." These procedures would no doubt please Surrey, but the continued
growth of tax expenditures would not. Indeed, that growth presents a paradox:
spending through the tax code has continued to rise faster than government
spending has as a whole, despite repeated efforts to publicize and rein in the
costs of tax expenditures.
sidered "provision by provision" to see if they are desirable, without reference to whether
the policy departs from taxing Haig-Simons income (that is, consumption plus savings). Id.
at 925. We show that the framing of the policy matters for this "provision by provision" re-
view since that framing affects how people view the policy.




10. 2 U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012) (defining tax expenditures and the tax expenditure budget); 2
U.S.C. S 63 2(e)(2)(E) (2012) (requiring that this budget be produced); 31 U.S.C. §
1105(a)(16) (2012) (same).
ii. These points and others are discussed in helpful detail in Edward A. Zelinsky, The Counter-
productive Nature of Tax Expenditure Budgets, 137 TAx NOTEs 1, 2 & n.2 (2012). As of 2010,
only Alabama, Nevada, South Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia did not have
some form of tax expenditure budget. Michael Leachman, Dylan Grundman & Nicholas
Johnson, Promoting State Budget Accountability Through Tax Expenditure Reporting, CENTER
ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES 38-43 (May 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-11
-lzsfp.pdf [http://perma.cc/K9J7-RVGM].
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Our Note helps to explain this apparent paradox. We offer evidence on
how the American public thinks about tax expenditures as opposed to spend-
ing programs organized outside the tax code. We obtain this evidence through
a survey experiment that tests how support for (and perceptions of) public
spending policies vary not based on the substance or expense of a policy, but
simply on whether a policy is described as a tax expenditure or direct outlay.
We use Google Consumer Surveys (GCS) to ask panels (which aim to be de-
mographically representative of the United States Internet-using population)
for their views on a variety of policy options, including hypothetical subsidies
for the housing market and the disabled.2 We keep the substance and total cost
of the policies functionally identical. We then ask one group for its views on a
policy that is described as a direct expenditure, and the other for its views on a
policy that is described as a tax break.
By asking similar panels for their views on such questions, we are able to
study the way in which a policy's framing affects public support and public
perceptions, and we are able to isolate this framing effect in an empirically rig-
orous manner. In particular, this method allows us to test the hypothesis that
citizens are more likely to support "hidden" spending that occurs through the
tax code, rather than "direct" spending that occurs through another policy
mechanism, such as payment via cash or check. And this method allows us to
test whether tax expenditures simply appear less expensive than direct outlays.
Our results are strongly consistent with both hypotheses. Americans are
more likely to support policies when they are described as tax expenditures,
and they are more likely to view tax expenditures as cheaper than direct out-
lays. In our baseline comparisons, respondents were ten percentage points
more likely to support our hypothetical, economically equivalent policies when
we framed them as tax breaks rather than as direct outlays. These results held
true across a variety of policy areas, and they held true when we varied the
amount of information that we offered about how tax expenditures work. Re-
spondents were also more likely to say that a program added "a lot" to the defi-
cit if it was described as a direct outlay instead of a tax expenditure, even
though the programs were listed with the same explicit cost.
These results make several contributions to the existing literature. First, we
apply a better methodology to a wider range of contexts than did past studies
to help answer significant outstanding questions in the political science, eco-
nomics, and tax-law literatures. Second, we test the robustness of the idea that
12. Google's methodology has some drawbacks, including the fact that it permits only short
questions and induces quick responses from recipients. Nonetheless, it has performed in
ways comparable to more traditional telephone surveys. These methodological issues are
taken up in detail in Part II.
1256
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"spending through the tax code" produces a framing effect by varying the
amount of information we provide to our survey respondents; this question
speaks to the issue of why citizens are so inclined to favor tax expenditures. Fi-
nally, we connect our results to key debates in the economics and political sci-
ence literatures, and we discuss the implications for economic welfare, modem
tax law, and democratic decision making about public spending.
The rest of this Note is divided into five Parts.13 Part I positions our
contribution in the relevant literature on tax expenditures and the behavioral-
economics approach to taxation. Part II describes our methodology in more
detail. Part III offers a fuller description of our results. Part IV discusses
limitations and implications. Part V concludes.
I. TAX EXPENDITURES AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS IN CONTEXT
A. The Existing Tax Literature
In the tax-law literature, the general distinction between spending inside
and outside the tax code is typically associated with the work of Stanley Surrey,
who reportedly coined the term "tax expenditure."' 4 Surrey is well-known for
emphasizing that " [t] he federal income tax system consists really of two parts,"
one which "comprises the structural provisions necessary to implement the in-
come tax," and another that "comprises a system of tax expenditures under
which Governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through
special tax provisions rather than through direct Government expenditures." 5
Surrey had many criticisms of the tax-expenditure system: he thought it
confused Congress, muddled the administration of social programs, 17 and
made the tax code more complicated.'8 But a particularly notable theme of Sur-
rey's work is that tax expenditures are "hidden."' 9 Despite the fact that tax ex-
penditures are now identified and budgeted like other expenditures -a long-
13. We also include a short methodological appendix. See infra Appendix.
14. See Stanley S. Surrey, Assistant Sec'y, U.S. Treasury, The U.S. Income Tax System-The
Need for a Full Accounting, Address Before the Money Marketers (Nov. 15, 1967).
is. SuRREY, supra note 6, at 6.
16. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Compari-
son with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. Ray. 705, 728 (1970).
17. Id. at 729.
is. Id. at 731-32.
ig. Id. at 731 ("[C]omparisons of tax expenditures and direct expenditures must be comparisons
of hidden programs with open ones.").
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time goal of Surrey's' ° - the hidden nature of tax expenditures is a theme that
still runs through contemporary literature on taxation and public policy. In his
book The Hidden Welfare State, for example, the political scientist Christopher
Howard writes that "tax expenditures with social welfare objectives are largely
invisible to citizens, policy makers, and academics who study U.S. social poli-
c, "21
cy."
The premise that tax expenditures are or would be treated differently from
direct outlays is, in some sense, counterintuitive from the perspective of public
finance. Most scholars of public finance would consider tax expenditures to be
"conceptually equivalent" to direct outlays.' Indeed, tax expenditures can
always be described in a manner that makes them seem identical to direct
spending-one in which (as Howard puts it) "taxpayers write a check to the
government for their full tax liability, and the government issues them a check
to cover those activities exempted from taxation."' As consumers of govern-
ment benefits, taxpayers should value a dollar of cash just as much as a dollar of
tax relief. As taxpayers who fund government programs and vote for elected
officials, they should view a dollar of government spending as equivalent to a
dollar of forgone tax revenue.' Considered at this level of abstraction, public
support for a spending program should not depend on whether that spending
goes through the tax code.
20. See Stanley S. Surrey & Paul R. McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and the Budget Re-
form Act of 1974, 5 B.C. L. REv. 679, 725 (1976) (describing initial budgeting efforts as "a ma-
jor advance both for those concerned with budget efficiency and for those concerned with
tax equity").
21. CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POL-
ICY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1997).
22. Id. Nearly all traditional economic models are "outcome equivalent" in that when there is no
uncertainty, actors consider only the final results, not how the results are achieved. This
view is incompatible with different preferences for tax expenditures and direct outlays that
provide identical results. See, e.g., Claudia R. Sahm, Matthew D. Shapiro & Joel Slemrod,
Check in the Mail or More in the Paycheck: Does the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus Depend on
How it is Delivered?, 4 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 216, 216 (2012) (noting that whether a sub-
sidy is delivered by check or through the tax code is "immaterial in a standard economic
model with rational and unconstrained consumers," but finding that consumers likely do
spend differently when money is received through a different mechanism).
23. HOWARD, supra note 21, at 3-4.
24. There might be some circumstances under which this is not true. As discussed in more de-
tail below, there may be organizational efficiencies in administering a policy either through
the tax code (for example, if the IRS must already collect all the information necessary to de-
termine program eligibility) or by direct spending (for example, if non-IRS agency expertise
is needed to administer it). See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax
and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004). But, for reasons we discuss below, we think
these efficiencies are very unlikely to explain our results. See infra Part IV.A.2.
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But do real-life taxpayers actually treat a dollar of direct spending as equiv-
alent to a dollar of tax expenditure? In our opinion, the tax-expenditure litera-
ture generally answers this question in the negative -but it has received sur-
prisingly little empirical attention. One of the few tax-law papers to study this
subject directly is a 2005 article by Edward Zelinsky, which used a student sur-
vey to assess how different types of financial support for firefighters affected
how respondents perceived their "volunteer" status.2' Zelinsky's subject matter
was drawn from a real policy dilemma: increasingly stringent requirements for
training firefighters make it difficult for communities to recruit volunteers, but
many communities are nonetheless reluctant to pay firefighters directly. As a
result, some communities apparently offer tax breaks to their volunteer fire-
fighters, such as property tax reductions.26 The idea is that the tax breaks offer
a financial inducement to become a volunteer firefighter -but not an induce-
ment that is so explicit as to threaten the volunteer status of the position.
To see how the different forms of compensation affected public perceptions
of these "volunteers," Zelinsky distributed questionnaires to several groups of
law students at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.27 Half were asked
whether a direct payment affected the volunteer standing of firefighters, while
the other half were asked whether a tax exemption did the same thing. 8 Zel-
insky finds strong evidence that respondents are more likely to view recipients
of a tax break (rather than a direct payment) as volunteers in good standing.29
An older attempt to study such questions empirically is a book chapter by
Steven Sheffrin.3° Sheffrin looks primarily at how the public conceives of a fair
sharing of the tax burden, but he also briefly considers the question of how
public views diverge from views commonly held by professional economists.3
To see if the public shares economists' view that tax expenditures and direct
outlays are equivalent, Sheffrin asked i5o students in an economics class about
their opinions of an investment subsidy plan for firms?2 He described the plan
in one instance as a $i million tax break and in the second as a $i million pay-
aS. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer Firefighters,
Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. TAX REv. 797
(2005).
26. Id. at 81.
27. Id. at 816.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8oo.
30. Steven M. Sheffrin, Perceptions of Fairness in the Crucible of Tax Policy, in TAX PROGRESSwrr
AND INCOME INEQ.UAUTY 309, 324-31 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1994).
31. Id. at 325.
32. Id.
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ment.33 In the baseline scenario, the students had a similar view of the favora-
bility of the tax break and direct subsidy programs.' 4
However, when asked a follow-up question in which tax credits reduced
the companies' tax liability to zero, the students had a substantially more fa-
vorable view of the direct subsidy program." In other words, they preferred the
program under which the firms "paid" some taxes, even if this payment was
exactly offset by a check from the government. Sheffrin attributes this result to
respondents' belief that "[elntities should pay taxes" and the fact that they
were not looking solely at the company's net position6
While the tax literature has recognized the importance of tax expenditures,
therefore, relatively little empirical work has been done on whether the public
actually thinks of them as different from direct outlays.
B. Recent Political Science Literature
Outside of legal scholarship on taxation, two recent political science papers
have used survey evidence to study the public's perception of spending pro-
grams. Christopher Faricy and Christopher Ellis asked university students
about their opinions of three social spending programs: the mortgage interest
deduction, the deduction for retirement savings, and food stamps.37 They pre-
sented the programs to some students as tax expenditures and to others as the
equivalent direct outlays,38 and they found weak evidence that respondents
preferred identical programs couched as tax expenditures.39 For each program,
the tax expenditure equivalent was more popular than the direct outlay, but
this difference was small and only statistically significant for one of the three
programs.4' The authors also found that the effect is bigger for Republican
students than for Democratic students.41
33. Id.
34. Id. at 326.
35. Id. at 326-27.
36. Id. at 327.
37. See Christopher Faricy & Christopher Ellis, Public Attitudes Toward Social Spending in the
United States: The Differences Between Direct Spending and Tax Expenditures, 36 POL. BEHAv.
53, 6o-6i (2014).
38. Id. at 62.
39. Id. at 68.
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Jake Haselswerdt and Brandon Bartels take a similar approach in an un-
published working paper.4 Unlike the other papers mentioned above and be-
low, Haselswerdt and Bartels do not use a student sample. Instead, like us,
they use a survey that attempts to reach a representative sample of the U.S.
population.43 They asked about three programs: the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, job training, and paid parental leave. 44 Among other things, they describe
the programs as either a tax expenditure or an equivalent direct outlay.4 They
find that each program is significantly more popular when described as a tax
expenditure. 46
C. Research in Behavioral Economics and Political Framing
The studies above follow a method that is widely employed in behavioral
research: asking two demographically similar groups of respondents a question
in which the substance is identical but the framing is different.47 This research
agenda seeks to isolate what is now called the framing effect.4 Amos Tversky
and Daniel Kahneman popularized this approach in a classic series of behavior-
al experiments,49 finding, for example, that identical life-saving policies are
more popular when the outcomes are framed in terms of lives saved rather than
lives lost.s° As applied to tax expenditures, Zelinsky derives a similar result,
finding that "policies unacceptable when framed as direct expenditures become
42. Jake Haselswerdt & Brandon L. Bartels, Public Opinion, Policy Tools, and Policy Feedbacks:
Evidence from a Survey Experiment (Sept. 16, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors). We thank the authors for their permission to cite this work.
43. See id. (manuscript at io).
44. Id. (manuscript at lo-ii).
45. Id. (manuscript at 11-12).
46. Id. (manuscript at 14).
47. See, e.g., Irwin P. Levin, Associative Effects of Information Framing, 25 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC
Soc'Y 85, 8S-86 (1987) (describing and utilizing information framing).
48. For one recent overview (with an emphasis on the underlying biology) see Benedetto De
Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the Human Brain, 313 SCIENCE
684 (2o6).
49. See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 807 ("A seminal demonstration of framing effects was a now-
classic and much emulated experiment in which Professors Tversky and Kahneman asked
two comparable but separate groups to decide between two alternative policies in the face of
an impending epidemic.").
5o. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus.
251, 254-55 (1986).
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supportable when labeled as tax subsidies, even though the economic sub-
stance of the policies is the same.""1
Political scientists have also considered the relationship between public
spending and framing. They have studied, among other things, how different
political parties frame their approaches to spending; 2 how political framing
differs from political persuasion; 3 and how framing interacts with political
competition and the formation of citizen preferences.'
In continuing to study how tax expenditures are viewed in comparison to
direct outlays, we also join a growing literature on behavioral-economic ap-
proaches to tax policy."5 This field is increasingly interested in how general
principles of behavioral economics can be applied to tax policy, and in develop-
ing original experiments that might inform tax-law design. 6 Many of these
studies find that individuals react to taxes in ways not predicted by standard
economic theory. 7
D. Our Contribution to the Existing Literature
Our approach complements and builds on existing work in several ways.
s. Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 799.
52. See William G. Jacoby, Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending, 44 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 750 (2000).
53. Thomas E. Nelson et al., Toward a Psychology of Framing Effects, 19 POL. BEHAV. 221 (1997).
54. Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, Framing Theory, lo ANN. REV. POL. SCL 103 (2007);
James N. Druckman, The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence, 23 PoL. BE-
HAV. 225 (2001).
55. There is growing empirical literature on "tax salience." See, e.g., Raj Chetty et al., Salience
and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 1145 (2009) (performing an experi-
ment at stores and finding consumers do not filly account for taxes that are charged at the
counter rather than posted in their purchase decisions (for example, most sales taxes)); Amy
Finkelstein, E-ZTax: Tax Salience and Tax Rates, 124 QJ. ECON. 969 (2oo9) (finding that
electronic billing makes consumers less aware of tolls and leads to increased use of tolls
where such systems are in place); Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your
Eyes: Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity, 5 AM. EcON. J. 302 (2013) (finding that only low-
income consumers are responsive to cigarette taxes applied at the counter). For more general
studies, see Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 1o6, 1o6 (2006) (reporting "the findings of several experiments about percep-
tions of various aspects of tax-law design"); and William Congdon, Jeffrey R. Kling & Sen-
dhil Mullainathan, Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15328, 2009), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15328.pdf [http://perma
.cc/8H9A-RA7T] (reviewing the implications of recent developments in behavioral econom-
ics for tax policy).
56. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 55 (performing one such experiment).
57. For an overview of these studies, see generally McCaffery & Baron, supra note 55.
1262
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i. The Representativeness of Our Sample
We believe our sample is a substantial improvement over existing work.
First, we reach a diverse, non-expert sample that is close to representative of
the electorate. All of the other papers that compare tax expenditures and direct
outlays, except Haselswerdt and Bartels's working paper,"8 use student sam-
ples. Such samples can be problematic. For example, Sheffrin's study is de-
signed to illustrate that the public's views diverge from the views of conven-
tional economics, but the students he surveys were in an economics class.5 9
That is a specific example of a general phenomenon. Student samples often
differ from the general population in systematic ways that matter. One survey
paper found that student responses "differed substantially" from those of the
population at large in 48% of social science studies where they could be com-
pared.6° For our purposes, students are likely to differ substantially from the
average population on at least two important dimensions: their level of educa-
tion and their experience paying taxes.
Highly educated people, particularly those trained in quantitative fields,
may be less susceptible to framing.61 Zelinsky hypothesizes that this explains
differences in the framing effect among his students, 62 and this may be one ex-
planation for why Sheffrin does not initially find a framing effect.
Moreover, students are less experienced with tax expenditures than the
population as a whole, and this might make them poor proxies. For example,
like Faricy and Ellis, and Haselswerdt and Bartels, we ask about the mortgage
58. The Haselswerdt and Bartels survey is tacked onto a larger survey on political opinions. See
Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42 (manuscript at io). Seeing the other questions in that
survey may "prime" people, changing their answers from what they would have said if they
were asked about tax expenditures only. Similarly, each person answered three tax expendi-
ture questions. Id. Earlier questions may also prime respondents with regards to later ques-
tions, although the authors try to minimize this effect by randomizing the order of the ques-
tions. Id.
5g. See Sheffrin, supra note 30, at 325.
60. Robert A. Peterson, On the Use of College Students in Social Science Research: Insights from a
Second-Order Meta-Analysis, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 450, 458 (2001) (analyzing studies drawn
from a "social science database").
61. See Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy and Decision Making, 17 PSYCHOL. SC. 407 (2oo6). Peters's
study found that individuals with higher education, and in particular higher numeracy were
less susceptible to the frame. However, the general applicability of this study is unclear be-
cause the frame in that case was entirely mathematical (two ways of presenting the same
number).
6a. See Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 818. Zelinsky found that men's opinions differed less depend-
ing on the frame than women's, and speculated that this was because men were more likely
to be trained in economics, math, or business. See id.
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interest deduction. There are some differences in wording, but all three studies
asked about support for the deduction in light of its $1oo billion annual cost.
Our study and that of Haselswerdt and Bartels -studies aimed at the popula-
tion at large -found that support was roughly 55%.63 However, when shown
the costs, only 21% of Faricy and Ellis's students supported the deduction. 
64
Faricy and Ellis's students were likewise not affected by the frame, whereas
both our paper and that of Haselswerdt and Bartels found a difference in sup-
portof25 to 35 percentage points. 6 As a result, we believe that our results are a
more reliable measure of the framing effect than those derived from student
samples.
2. Distinguishing Our Questions and Implications
In addition to studying a more representative sample, our approach differs
from previous work in several ways. First, we explore the framing effect in a
range of contexts, including support for housing programs, aid to the disabled,
and the question of whether people prefer to receive cash or equivalent tax
credits and whether they perceive tax expenditures to be less expensive. Taken
together, this variation across policy areas helps show that the framing effect is
wide-ranging and sheds light on the source of that effect.66
Second, we show that the public's preference for tax expenditures persists
even when we describe the mechanics of a tax expenditure in some detail. This
helps ensure that the source of the framing effect is not confusion over how the
tax programs work or who gets the benefit. In their surveys, Haselswerdt and
Bartels, as well as Faricy and Ellis, do not clarify the mechanics of their pro-
grams in the same way. For example, while Faricy and Ellis express concern
that citizens do not understand tax expenditures, they do not illustrate the in-
sight empirically. 67 Instead, the questions in their study and in that of Ha-
63. Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42 (manuscript at 22).
64. Faricy & Ellis, supra note 37, at 66.
65. See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42 (manuscript at 29).
66. Zelinsky's work on the perception of volunteer status is somewhat limited by the narrow
focus of the study. People have unique ideas about what, if any, personal benefits can be ob-
tained while still being considered a volunteer, which likely interact with their perceptions
of tax expenditures relative to direct outlays. See Ram A. Cnaan et al., Defining Who Is a Vol-
unteer: Conceptual and Empirical Considerations, 25 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 364
(1996) (describing the wide dispersion in definitions and empirically held beliefs about
what constitutes a "volunteer").
67. See Faricy and Ellis, supra note 37, at 58. While we find that increasing the amount of infor-
mation about the mechanics of the tax expenditure does not have a big impact, we think it is
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selswerdt and Bartels are somewhat unclear. For example, Haselswerdt and
Bartels ask respondents whether they support making those who take a job re-
training class "eligible for a tax break, that is, a reduction in the income tax
they owe to help cover the cost of the class," and similarly describe the direct
expenditure as simply "a cash payment to help cover the cost of the class." 68
Respondents may simply assume that the payments will be larger or smaller
depending on which vehicle is used for payments. Even in other questions in
which the researchers specify the total cost, the programs are not necessarily
equivalent in terms of how much each person receives, particularly since often
the tax expenditures are phrased as deductions, but the direct outlays appear
more similar to credits.6 9
Third, we avoid using existing programs - except the mortgage interest de-
duction- to measure the framing effect. All of the programs in the Faricy and
Ellis study are currently implemented in the United States,70 as are two-thirds
of those in the Haselswerdt and Bartels study.71
Asking about these "status quo" programs is potentially problematic for a
number of reasons. Rational respondents might prefer not to change only the
mechanism by which an existing program is delivered, since switching the
mechanism is presumably costly and the substance of the program will remain
the same. In addition, respondents might simply be confused as to why an ex-
isting program is being framed as a hypothetical choice. They may pick the sta-
tus quo when a choice is too complex; they may pick it in protest.' Or re-
spondents may simply be affected by the well-known status quo bias, which
important to know that the framing effect does not stem from uncertainty or misunder-
standing about how the program works. See infra Part III.
68. See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42 (manuscript app. at 34-35). Their mortgage interest
question has a similar structure. See id. at 34.
69. See Faricy & Ellis, supra note 37, at 62, 74-75; Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42 (manu-
script at 35-36). The value of deductions is greater for higher income tax payers, who pay
higher marginal taxes, while (refundable) credits are equally valuable to all taxpayers. Our
direct spending equivalent to the mortgage interest deduction also suffers a bit from this is-
sue because, for simplicity, the value of the subsidy does not depend on income. See infra
note 1o6. Note also that this criticism does not apply to Haselswerdt and Bartels's final
question on paid parental leave where the payments are specified to be loo% of lost income.
Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42, app. at 36.
70. See Faricy & Ellis, supra note 37, at 6x ("[All three programs mirror existing federal pro-
grams in cost, intent, and actual redistributive effects.").
pi. See Haselswerdt & Bartels, supra note 42 (manuscript app. at 35-36).
72. See Wiktor Adamowicz et al., Stated Preference Approaches for Measuring Passive Use Values:
Choice Experiments and Contingent Valuation, 8o AM. J. AGRic. ECON. 64, 73 (1998) ("It could
be that individuals chose the status quo response when the task of selecting options was too
complex or when they were uncertain about the trade-offs they would be willing to make.
Choosing the status quo could also be a form of protest response.").
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has been extensively studied in behavioral economics.73 The notable point is
that, in each of these scenarios, something other than a question's framing-as
either a tax expenditure or direct outlay - may partially influence the response.
Such status quo issues are well understood to be a problem in survey de-
sign.74 Indeed, the difference between new and status quo options can be
enormous, even when the real payoff is the same. One well-known study of in-
dividual biases toward risk, for example, found that only 27% of survey re-
spondents were willing to pay $700 for a safety measure that guaranteed a
0.5% reduction in the risk of an injury in a given year; that number jumped to
6o% when the safety feature in question was described as an industry stand-
ard.7' In at least one influential study of stated-preference survey design, these
problems were considered worrying enough that respondents who always se-
lected a status quo were categorized along with respondents who selected "I
don't know.", 6 Haselswerdt and Bartels are aware of this issue, and in fact one
of their goals is to measure whether the status quo "communicat[es] to the
public how different problems should be viewed and solved."' But we are not
sure that they can separate this effect from the other status quo issues discussed
above.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, we consider the implications of these
findings in ways that differ greatly from previous work. We explore the likely
underlying causes of the framing effect, as well as the relationship between
framing effects and welfare economics. We then highlight the implications of
citizens' preference for tax expenditures for the way in which the Internal Rev-
enue Code is written. We use our results to suggest a new and counterintuitive
73. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo
Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193 (1991); see also William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Sta-
tus Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988) (identifying the modern
status quo bias for the first time).
74. See David Dreyer Lassen, The Effect of Information on Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Natural
Experiment, 49 AM. J. PoL. ScI. 103, 105 (2005) ("Uncertainty about [an] issue could take the
form of a status quo bias, documented in a variety of settings, leading uncertain voters to
vote for the status quo where abstaining, according to the reasoning in the models, would be
optimal.").
75. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Asymmetric Assessments in Valuing Pharmaceutical Risks, 34 MED.
CARE DS34, DS41-42 (Supp. 1996) (citing Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evi-
dence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1277 (1989)) (describing the
implications of the Knetsch study in terms of the status quo bias).
76. See Adamowicz et al., supra note 72, at 68 n.3 ("We are assuming that individuals who al-
ways chose the status quo regardless of the attribute levels were essentially not responding
to the CE task. Thus these responses were treated the same as an 'I don't know' response in
a CVM question.").
77. See Haselswerdt & Bartels supra note 42 (manuscript at 7).
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explanation for why tax expenditures have grown: because the public is actual-
ly paying more attention to government budgets. We also suggest that the
public's fondness for tax expenditures should be added to the traditional list of
factors that drive the increasing complexity of the tax code and is perhaps one
of the best explanations for why ordinary taxpayers find the tax system so
maddeningly complex. Finally, we make a new connection between tax ex-
penditures and other areas of the law in which increasing transparency has po-
tentially serious drawbacks.
II. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
A. Using Google Consumer Surveys
We developed a survey instrument using Google Consumer Surveys
(GCS), a popular and relatively inexpensive online survey tool designed for use
by both companies and researchers.8 GCS is a relatively new service-the
product was launched in March 2012 79-but it has already been used to pro-
8,duce peer-reviewed papers in a variety of fields, including political science,
psychology, ' and business.
82
78. Paul McDonald et al., Comparing Google Consumer Surveys to Existing Probability and Non-
Probability Based Internet Surveys, GOOGLE CONSUMER SURVS. 3 (2o12), http://www.google
.corn/insights/consumersurveys/static/consumer surveys whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc
/sMCM-TK6S].
79. Paul McDonald, A New Way to Access Quality Content Online, GOOGLE NEWS: BLOG (Mar.
29, 2012, 10:21 AM), http://googlenewsblog.blogspot.co.uk/2o12/o3/new-way-to-access
-quality-content.html [http://perma.cc/YS45-CGUW].
so. See, e.g., Jessica Lavariega Monforti et al., ePor Quijn Votar? Experimental Evidence About
Language, Ethnicity and Vote Choice (Among Republicans), I POL., GROUPS, & IDENTITIES 475,
481 (2013) ("By asking different single questions of multiple samples [using GCS], research-
ers can conduct a survey experiment .... The tool is ideal for survey experiments ... be-
cause randomized assignment to different questions holds unobserved variables constant."
(citation omitted)). This paper uses GCS to consider how voters respond to identical candi-
dates who are or are not bilingual.
81. See, e.g., Andrew K. Przybylski, Who Believes Electronic Games Cause Real World Aggression?,
17 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY, BEHAV. & Soc. NETWORKING 228, 229 (2014) ("GCS produces highly
accurate results in line with other probability-based panel survey approaches. Importantly,
GCS demonstrates substantially higher response rates (15-20%) compared to sampling
rates observed industry wide (0.1-2%) across a range of polling topics."). This paper uses
GCS to study national beliefs about the relationship between violent video games and real-
life violence.
82. See, e.g., Shane Frederick et al., The Limits of Attraction, 51 J. MARKETING RES. 487, 491 (2014)
("Although our prior results - and, more to the point, our repeated non results - led us to
predict no attraction effect when quality was represented visually, we were curious whether
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We discuss in detail below the extent to which our panel is likely to be rep-
resentative of the U.S. population. We conclude that there are some reasons to
believe that our panel is not fully representative -but, in the end, it is likely to
be close, and it offers substantial advantages over the classroom surveys uti-
lized in existing publications.
Unlike several other online survey tools-which hire a representative panel
of respondents"3 or otherwise manage a marketplace for survey questions 4 -
GCS presents survey questions to general Internet users in the form of a "wall"
preventing access to premium Internet content. Just as a visitor to a website
might be required to watch an advertisement or pay a fee before accessing
premium content (typically known as a "paywall"), GCS lets Internet users an-
swer a survey question.8 ' This "surveywall" is intended to be relatively brief
and painless. Google's theory is that, "[b]y reducing the burden [of responding
to a survey] to just one or two clicks, we increase the response rate of the sur-
vey."86 According to Google, this produces an average response rate of
16.75%.8' Google argues that this response rate compares favorably to other
commonly used Internet or traditional phone survey tools.
88
Unlike many other survey tools, Google does not ask respondents to report
their age, gender, location, income, or other demographic information. In-
stead, Google reports that "Consumer Surveys infers approximate demograph-
ic and location information using the respondent's IP address and DoubleClick
cookie," which Google uses to "ensure each survey receives a representative
the marginally significant repulsion effect we obtained would replicate, so we reran the
study using Google Surveys, which enabled us to obtain very large samples quickly."). This
paper uses a variety of survey tools-including GCS and Mechanical Turk-to study the
prevalence of the "attraction effect," wherein the addition of an irrelevant third consumption
option changes consumer perceptions of the two preexisting options.
83. See, e.g., Panel Methodology, YouGov, http://research.yougov.co.uk/services/panel
-methodology [http://perma.cc/3BVB-2K9R]; see also Siona Robin Listokin et al., Ameri-
cans' Preferences for Tax Increases and Spending Cuts, 139 TAX NOTES 188 (2013) (using
YouGov to examine how Americans would alter spending and taxes to close the budget defi-
cit).
84. See MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk [http://perma.cc/445U-QXMT];
see also Ilyana Kuziemko et al., How Elastic Are Preference for Redistribution? Evidence from
Randomized Survey Experiments (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18865,
2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl8865.pdf [http://perma.cc/LF6D-NHKB] (using
Mechanical Turk to gather data on attitudes toward tax policy).
85. See How It Works, GOOGLE CONSUMER SURvS., http://www.google.com/insights
/consumersurveys/how [http ://perma.cc/TRK-70,42].
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sample and to enable survey researchers to see how sub-populations answered
questions."8 9 Not asking for this information improves response rates and al-
lows questions to be asked free of any survey "priming. "9° We discuss the ac-
curacy of Google's methods below and include further details in a short Ap-
pendix.
The representativeness and reliability of the GCS survey population have
been tested and discussed favorably in two studies - one from the Pew Founda-
tion9' and one from Google itself.92 Google's study compared GCS surveys to
"gold standard" national telephone surveys - one private and one conducted by
the Centers for Disease Control-by using questions identical to those in the
"gold standard" surveys. 93 Google also hired two well-respected Internet sur-
vey firms to ask the same questions.94 The search giant concluded that its own
survey tool outperforms other Internet survey providers on several bench-
marks. 9
The Pew Research Center, meanwhile, performed "a series of tests covering
a wide range of topics and question types to compare results from Pew Re-
search telephone surveys to those obtained using the Google Consumer Sur-
veys method. ' '96 GCS performed relatively well overall. Across forty-eight
questions, the median difference between GCS and the Pew surveys was 3%.97
Of particular interest for our survey, Pew concluded that "the Google Consum-
er Surveys sample appears to conform closely to the demographic composition
of the overall internet population." 98 In terms of political views, GCS respond-
89. Id. (citations omitted).
go. Id. ("Inferring this demographic data enables Consumer Surveys researchers to ask fewer
questions in a survey which in turn increases response rates.").
91. Scott Keeter & Leah Christian, A Comparison of Results from Surveys by the Pew Research Cen-
ter and Google Consumer Surveys, PEw RES. CENTER (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.people
-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/x1-7-12%2oGoogle%zoMethodology/o2opaper.pdf [http://perma
.cc/BY5Z-4CJP].
92. McDonald et al., supra note 78.
93. Id. at 6.
94. See id. at 5.
95. Id. at 6-9. For example, Google reports that the "average absolute error for the non-Google
samples was 5.29% across all benchmarks, while the Google samples averaged 3.76%." Id. at
7. GCS attempts to target the Internet-using population, while the benchmark surveys were
aimed at the whole population, and therefore we should not be surprised to see some differ-
ences.
96. Keeter & Christian, supra note 91, at 1.
97. Id. at 2. The mean was 6%, driven by a few questions in which the differences were relative-
ly large. Id. There may be innocent explanations for these differences, as in some cases the
Pew questions and potential answers did not entirely match what GCS put out. Id.
g8. Id.
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ents were "broadly similar [to the U.S. population], though some larger differ-
ences were observed."99 Nor was there a consistently conservative or liberal
bent to these differences.' In fact, Nate Silver concluded that GCS was the
second most accurate 2012 presidential poll, beating out CNN, Quinnipiac,
Gallup, and YouGov, among others. 1 '
Nonetheless, there are good reasons to believe that GCS panels are not per-
fectly representative of the entire U.S. population. First, Google surveys only
the U.S. Internet-using population, and 15% of the U.S. population does not
use the Internet."0 2 These individuals are disproportionately older and less edu-
cated, and this likely biases any survey of Internet users."0 3 Similarly GCS's
model does not guarantee that each panel is a random sample of all Internet
users. Nevertheless, the research discussed above suggests it is quite likely that
GCS is close to representative -and certainly a large improvement over the
classroom panels used in prior research. It is also likely to be much more repre-
sentative than Mechanical Turk, where survey respondents are paid for each
survey that they complete, raising a number of problems- including self-
selection and potential misrepresentation.0 4 In spite of these problems, Me-
chanical Turk studies have found generally receptive audiences. °s
99. Id. at 9.
oo. Id. at lo.
ol. Nate Silver, Which Polls Fared Best (and Worst) in the 2012 Presidential Race, N.Y. TIMEs:
F1VETHiRTYEIGHT (Nov. 1O, 2012, 8:38 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com
/2012/il/io/which-polls-fared-best-and-worst-in-the-2012-presidential-race [http://perma
.cc/SL29-KKGL].
102. See Kathryn Zickuhr, Who's Not Online and Why, PEW REs. CENTER. 2 (2013), http://
www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2o13/PIP-Offline%2oadults 092513
PDF.pdf [http ://perma.cc/9389-HET4].
103. Id. at 5. We think it very likely that our sample skews toward more educated respondents,
which means that we actually underestimate the framing effect.
1o4. See, e.g., Dan Kahan, Fooled Twice, Shame on Who? Problems with Mechanical
Turk Study Samples, Part 2, CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (July lo, 2013,
9:30 AM), http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/7/lo/fooled-twice-shame-on-who
-problems-with-mechanical-turk-stud.html [http://perma.cc/3KGU-MFUM] (noting a va-
riety of problems with Mechanical Turk panels, including selection issues with voluntary
Mechanical Turk workers, problems of repeated exposure to research studies, and misrepre-
sentation among survey participants); Kuziemko et al., supra note 84, at 7 (discussing how
the authors confronted issues with Mechanical Turk, including foreign professional survey
takers and how survey release times had to be altered to minimize the impact of these pro-
fessionals).
ios. See, for example, articles published in prominent economics and political science journals,
including Justin Grimmer et al., How Words and Money Cultivate a Personal Vote: The Effect of
Legislator Credit Claiming on Constituent Credit Allocation, 1o6 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 703 (2012)
(using Mechanical Turk to gather information about how people react to political officials
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GCS does have some important drawbacks. First, we can ask only short
questions. Google imposes a 175-character limit on questions, which forced us
to think hard about how we worded our questions, and made it a challenge to
ask several questions about technical tax policy.1° 6 Second, because GCS ques-
tions pop up instantaneously, respondents see the question before committing
to answer-an issue that affects most Internet surveys but is arguably more
problematic in our case. Third, the fact that individual respondents will see on-
ly one question makes it impossible to study an individual respondent's an-
swers across questions.
On the other hand, GCS also offers some practical benefits. Consumer Sur-
veys are inexpensive -which allowed us to gather many thousands of fairly
representative observations at low cost-and have a relatively high response
rate. In our surveys, an average of 18% to 24% of Internet users who saw each
question responded. In addition, the fact that Google infers demographic data
means that we did not need to rely on respondents' self-reporting to obtain a
representative panel. We also did not have to rely on respondents' self-
reporting about sensitive matters like age and income. And, unlike Mechanical
Turk, GCS respondents do not answer questions for money.
B. Our Survey Questions
The central goal of our survey was to ask two demographically equivalent
groups of respondents whether they supported economically equivalent policy
proposals-one described in the form of a tax expenditure, the other in the
form of a direct outlay. Our central hypothesis, consistent with the notion that
spending through the tax code disguises the true cost, was that respondents
would be more likely to support policies that take the form of tax expenditures.
who claim credit for government spending); Douglas L. Kriner & Francis X. Shen, How Cit-
izens Respond to Combat Casualties: The Differential Impact of Local Casualties on Support for the
War in Afghanistan, 76 PuB. OPINION Q 761 (2012) (detailing a Mechanical Turk experiment
designed to explore whether support for wars varied when respondents read a mock-
account of a casualty from their state or from elsewhere); and Emily Oster et al., Optimal
Expectations and Limited Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington Disease, 103 AM. ECON.
REv. 804 (2013) (relying in part on Mechanical Turk data for information on how and why
Americans save for retirement).
1o6. In particular, our direct spending equivalent to the mortgage interest deduction had to be
modified. We did not have space to create an exactly equivalent program in which the per-
centage reimbursement increases with the taxpayer's income (as with the actual mortgage
interest deduction). For the other questions, without GCS's character limits, we might have
added more detail about why the policy might be a good idea and who would be eligible.
Generally, however, we felt that we were able to communicate all the information we want-
ed to communicate despite the limits.
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We also tested several secondary questions by varying the details of our
questions. One secondary question was whether the hypothesis above works
because respondents view tax expenditures as "cheaper." We tested this by ask-
ing respondents how they perceived the costs of equivalent tax expenditures
and direct outlays, and whether they would prefer to receive a tax credit or a
check. Another secondary question was whether taxpayers' preference for tax
expenditures would hold true across a range of policy types; we tested this
question by asking about hypothetical policies that support the housing market
and hypothetical subsidies for the disabled. A third secondary question was
whether respondents' views vary depending on whether the policy in question
is a new, hypothetical policy, or an existing and salient policy; we probed this
distinction by asking about the home mortgage interest deduction.
A fourth secondary question was whether respondents' views change de-
pending on how much information we provide about the policy proposals in
question. Because tax policy is relatively technical, in our view it is important to
try to distinguish between the framing effect and simple ambiguities in (or
misunderstandings of) how the policies in question operate. For example, it
might be apparent to those steeped in tax law or public finance that a dollar of
"refundable tax credit" is the conceptual equivalent of a dollar in cash -but
perhaps not to the average citizen. To get a sense of how this affects our re-
sults, we varied our descriptions of the tax expenditure. In some questions, we
spelled out in detail how refundable tax credits operate; in others we did not.
We also tested to see whether using the term "tax expenditure" itself affects the
results.
Finally, we asked several questions designed to rule out common alterna-
tive explanations that might indicate a bias toward spending through the tax
code, and to see whether policy preferences diverged from individual consump-
tion preferences.
In our first wave, we asked the following nine questions1° 7:
Q. Would you support the government offering annual $iooo cash pay-
ments to each family, to help cover rent?
02. Would you support reducing each family's taxes by $1ooo to help cov-
er rent? If a family owes less than $1ooo, they get the rest in cash.
107. Each question also included information required for informed consent telling respondents
that "this is an academic study" and that their participation was "voluntary and anony-
mous," which we have removed for convenience here.
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0,3. Would you support the government offering a $1ooo refundable tax
credit for each family, to help cover rent?
Q. . Do you support the government letting homeowners deduct their
mortgage interest payments?
Q5. Would you support the government replacing existing tax aid for
homeowners by matching 25% of their mortgage interest with cash?
Q6. Tax aid for homeowners costs $1oo billion a year. At the same cost,
would you instead support matching 25% of their mortgage interest with cash?
QZ. Tax aid for homeowners costs $1oo billion a year. Do you support the
government continuing to let them deduct their mortgage interest payments?
Q8. Would you support an annual $1ooo government cash payment to
each disabled person?
0,9. Would you support a tax credit reducing each disabled person's taxes
by $1ooo? If a person owes less than $iooo, he or she gets the rest in cash.
We released these questions in November 2013, spread over a weekend and
three weekdays.
The demographics of respondents and responses we received did not vary
by day of the week, indicating that the pool of potential respondents was simi-
lar during weekdays and weekends." s We received a little over 1,ooo responses
to each question. However, as can be seen in Table i below, not all of these re-
sponses were usable since some respondents chose to opt out and others lacked
full demographic data. ° 9 There is some evidence that more respondents opted
108. The response rate did vary to some degree. For example, it was higher during weekends, but
given the similarity of responses, we are not concerned that this variation will bias the re-
sults, particularly since the relative proportion of weekday and weekend responders is the
same across questions.
iog. If people opted out at random, then our survey would still be representative of the U.S. In-
ternet-using population-as a rough intuition: if you remove random individuals from a
random sample, you'll still have a random sample. Some of the opting-out, however, ap-
pears to be non-random since it is slightly correlated with people's demographic characteris-
tics. In particular, younger respondents opted out more often than older ones. Generally, the
differences are not very substantial: roughly 20% of our sample should have been 18-24, but
only 15% were (differences in the other age groups were smaller). Likewise, slightly more
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out of the more complex questions."' But we remain confident that this skew
is relatively minor. Even if, for the sake of argument, each additional person
who opted out of the more complex questions reduces the significance of our
results, our results still show that tax expenditures are substantially preferred
and the results are still statistically significant."'
In February 2014 we conducted a relatively small second survey designed to
ascertain whether applying the label "tax expenditure" to spending through the
tax code made any difference. In April 2014 we asked a larger sample about
their preferences for personally receiving direct-payment subsidies or tax cred-
its. Finally, in September 2014, we asked a large sample about how they per-
ceived the costs of direct outlays and tax expenditures.
Our results are summarized in the following tables.
women opted out than did men. There was no evidence that people with different incomes
opted out at different rates.
If this opt-out behavior was random within demographic groups, it still will not present
a problem because we can fix the issue using probability weighting. For example, imagine
that there should be twenty people in each of five age groups. If a random set often people
opt out of answering a question in the first age group, but everyone else answers in the rest
of the groups, we can get the "right" result by doubling the weight accorded to responses
from the first age group.
In the end, while we think it is unlikely that opt-out behavior within groups is entirely
random, we have no reason to believe that some non-random behavior should substantially
bias the results. In particular, we do not see any opting out based on income, which we
think is the variable most likely to be correlated with unobserved characteristics (for exam-
ple, education) that affect people's reactions to the frame. Likewise, we do not see any evi-
dence of opt-out behavior varying across different questions by age, sex, or income group,
which might otherwise threaten to bias our comparisons across questions.
11o. We believe the questions describing the mechanics of tax expenditures and cost of the pro-
grams are more complex as they required respondents to grapple with more information
than did questions laying out a simple government payment.
mii. An example may be illustrative: twenty-nine fewer respondents with full demographic in-
formation answered Question 9 (aid to disabled persons as a tax expenditure) compared to
Question 8 (the direct subsidy version). Respondents favored the credit over the direct sub-
sidy by roughly ten percentage points. This remains true even if we treat the additional
twenty-nine opt-outs for Question 9 as not supporting the policy. Doing so reduces the gap
to eight percentage points, which remains economically and statistically significant. This is
true for all paired questions.
However, we believe this treatment may overstate the true differences in beliefs among
selective opt-outs. It is likely that people who avoid more complex questions are more sus-
ceptible to the frame, since they seem to be less willing to use slow, logical thinking. (In the
Kahneman sense, this is System-Two thinking. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND
SLOW (2011).) Thus, any selective opting out on this basis probably causes an under- rather
than over-statement of the true framing effect presented below.
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III. RESULTS
Table i.
SURVEY OF PREFERENCES FOR USING DIRECT SUBSIDIES OR TAX CREDITS




Would you support the government offering
b: annual $1ooo cash payments to each family, to 632 24.09% 75.91%
L_ help cover rent? .
Would you support reducing each family's taxes
Q2 by $iooo to help cover rent? If a family owes 567 33.92% 66.o8%
less than $iooo, they get the rest in cash.
SWould you support the government offe-riig a-
$1ooo refundable tax credit for each family, to 611 35.09% 64.91%
. . ..help cover rent?
Do you support the government letting home-
OA owners deduct their mortgage interest pay- 596 67.50% 32-50%
ments?
"3 existing tax aid for homeowners by matching 514 25.50% 74,50%
3_5 % of their mortgage interest with cash? 5 4
Tax aid for homeowners costs $1oo billion a
year. At the same cost, would you instead sup- 20.02% 79.98%
port matching 25% of their mortgage interest 467
with cash?
tax aid for- iomeow-ners costs~i-obilion a
Syear. Do you support the government continu- 607 56-150%0 43-85%
ing to let them deduct their mortgage interest
payments? _
08 Would you support an annual $1ooo govern-
ment cash payment to each disabled person? 592 29.73% 7o.27%
__Mul you support ataxa c ed ~icngh
Q9 disabled person's taxes by $iooo? If a person s63 402% 57%
owes less than $iooo, he or she gets the rest in 40.23% 5
cash.
Would you support a tax expenditure reducing
Q1° each family's taxes by $1K to help cover rent? If
a family owes less than $iK, they get the rest in 318 37.1o% 62.90%
cash.
Wiild-you supprt educing-eaclf aiil s taxes
1 by $iooo to help cover rent? If a family owes 198 36.82/o 63.18%
less than $tooo, the get the rest in cash.5
t Grey bars are only for readability.
* Only individuals with full dcmographic information are used in the weighted calculation.
Roughly is% of respondents are missing such demographic information (age, gender, geogra-
phy). "Weighting" the data means adjusting for the fact that the samples were slightly more like-
ly pick up members of some demographic groups than others. In practice, the reweighting does
not make much difference because the characteristics of samples and the U.S. internet-using
population are similar.
§ Note Q!1 is identical to Q2, but since it was asked in a different wave of the survey, we ob-
tained responses again to ensure that the survey was still reaching the same audience and that
Attitudes had not shifted. The response is very similar.
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Table 2.
SURVEY OF PREFERENCES FOR RECEIVING DIRECT SUBSIDIES RELATIVE TO TAX
CREDITS
Respondents with Weighted Using
Question Full Demographic Demographic Info
Information Indiff't Check Credit
Would you prefer a credit reducing your
tax bill by $iooo (given as cash if you
owe less than $iooo) or a $1ooo check?
2 Check
• Credit
- I am indifferent
Would you prefer a credit reducing your
tax bill by $1ooo (given as cash if you
owe less than $iooo) or a $1ooo check?
023 * Check
" Credit
" I am indifferent; they are the same
Would you prefer a refundable tax credit
reducing your tax bill by $1ooo or a
4 $iooo check?
- Same options as Q2
Same as Q12 except options are:
* Check (when you file your taxes)
Q15 Credit (when you file your taxes)
* I am indifferent
36.68% 43.00% 20.31%_ _ _ _
37.91% 42.37% 19.72%
535 32.05% 50.39% 17-56%
531 43.37% 33.75% 22.88%
Would you prefer a one-time credit re-
ducing your tax bill by Siooo (given as
16 cash if you owe less than $1ooo) or a 508 42.68% 4o.69% 16.63%
one-time $1ooo check?
* Same options as O2
t For all questions respondents preferred the check to the credit. This preference is statistically
significant at the % level for each question.
Table 3.
SURVEY OF RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTION OF POLICY COSTS
R t with Weighted UsingRespodentsunth Demographic Info
Question Full Demographic D
Information Not at Not that ALotall much
Some propose spending $6 billion to reduce
each blind person's taxes by $i,ooo (paid in 881 24.650/0 43.82% 31.54%
cash if they owe less than $1,ooo). How
much will this increase the deficit?
ome propose spending -illion to-provid
Q18 each blind person with a $1,ooo cash pay- 8 22.81% o3% ".7ment. How much will this increase the defi-3 .87
cit?
Respondents' perception that the tax expenditure would add less to the deficit than the direct
outlay is statistically significant at the 5% level (p = o.o15) when data is tested using an ordered
logit regression. Using a multinomial logit produces a similar result (p = 0.003).
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Table 4.
COMPARISONS OF SURVEY ANSWERS
SpotB Difference
Question A Question B Support A Support B (A)(B)
Direct Spending v. Spending Through the Tax Code
Q2: Rent Subsidy through tax
,1: Direct Rent Subsidy credit (Default info given 24 09% 33.9% -9.82%
about credit)
Q3: Rent Subsidy through tax
Q: Direct Rent Subsidy credit (Less info given about 24.09% 35.09% -11.oo%
credit)
Direct Mortgage Inter- Q4: Continue Mortgage In- z5,o% 67.5o% -42.oo%
st Matching terest Deduction
Q6: Direct Mortgage Inter-QZ: Continue Mortgage In-
est Matching (Info on Cost terest Deduction (Cost info 20.02% 56.15% -36.12%
Given) given)
48 Direct Subsidy for Qo: Subsidy For Disabled ...
Pisabled Through Tax Credit 29-73% 40.23% -1o.5o%
Other Comparisons
02: Rent Subsidy through Q3: Rent Subsidy through tax
tax credit (Default info giv- credit (Less info given about 33.92% 35.09% -1.18%
en about credit) credit)
1P: Continue Mortgage
nterest Deduction
QZ: Continue Mortgage In-
terest Deduction (Cost info 67.50% 56.15% 11.35%
given)
Difference between OQ: Difference between 8:
Direct Rent Subsidy Direct Subsidy for Disabled &
& Q2: Rent Subsidy Q9: Subsidy For Disabled
through tax credit (Default Through Tax Credit (Default
info given about credit) info given)
Zip: Rent Subsidy
o: tacredit U si Qt: Rent Subsidy through
rouh tax cditre sing tax credit (not using "Tax Ex-






*** represents that the means are statistically different from each other at the i% level; ** repre-
sents significance at the 5% level. Calculations of statistical significance done using demograph-
ically weighted data. We calculate standard errors using the "Huber-White Sandwich estimator"
and population weights derived from "simple cell weighting" comparing the composition of the
sample to the Current Population Survey's (CPS) Internet Use data. This weighting scheme fol-
lows Google's methodology.
Our results strongly confirm the central hypothesis that individuals prefer
spending through the tax code to direct expenditures. In our baseline compari-
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sons, respondents were about lo percentage points more likely to support poli-
cy proposals when they were described as tax expenditures rather than as direct
outlays. This held true across policy types: respondents were 1o.5 percentage
points more likely to support a subsidy for the disabled when it was phrased as
a tax expenditure and 9.8 percentage points more likely to support a subsidy
for the rental market when described in similar terms. Respondents also very
strongly preferred the existing mortgage-interest deduction to an alternative
policy in which the government directly matched a portion of homeowner
mortgage payments. All of these results are statistically significant at the 1%
level.
We had hypothesized that more information about how tax expenditures
work would push some respondents to think about the underlying similarities
between spending through the tax code and direct spending. For example, not-
ing that "[i]f a family owes less than $1ooo, they get the rest in cash" probably
underscores these similarities more than explaining that each family gets "a
$iooo refundable tax credit." But surprisingly and notably, respondents were
only slightly more likely to support a tax expenditure when we offered less in-
formation about it, and the difference was not statistically significant. The ad-
ditional information on the mechanics of the tax expenditure did not appear to
alert respondents to the functional equivalence of tax expenditures and direct
outlays, at least not to a statistically significant extent.
Similarly, in our later survey, when we asked people whether they preferred
a $iooo check or an equivalent tax credit, more information did not reduce the
impact of the frame: when given more information, people were a bit more
likely to conclude that the two options were equally good, but that difference
was not statistically significant. On balance, we found these results surprising
and believe that they have important implications for tax policy (discussed be-
low). We do not find that using the term "tax expenditure" has any effect rela-
tive to simply describing the tax reduction.
We also found that respondents have a strong personal preference for re-
ceiving a check (rather than a tax reduction) from the government: that is,
while individuals would prefer to see tax expenditures enacted as policy, they
would prefer to receive direct outlays. This would be consistent with the hy-
pothesis that tax expenditures seem cheaper: the other side of the coin is that
they might seem less valuable.
Finally, and also consistent with the hypothesis that tax expenditures seem
cheaper, we found that respondents were less likely to think that tax expendi-
tures contributed substantially to the deficit. Specifically, 37% of respondents
said that a $6 billion dollar direct spending program added "a lot" to the defi-
cit, while only 32% of respondents said equivalent spending through the tax
code would add as much.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The results presented in the previous Part support the idea that individuals
prefer spending through the tax code to direct expenditures, and these results
are consistent with the framing effect. The results also suggest that the framing
effect holds true in a sample of survey respondents that are representative of
the national Internet-using population, across a range of policy types, and
when more information on tax expenditures is provided. Our evidence also
suggests that the framing effect is at least partly driven by a perception that tax
expenditures are cheaper from the point of view of the fisc. Likewise, individu-
al respondents are less likely to view a tax break as equally valuable as a direct
subsidy of the same size.
In this Part, we discuss our results more fully. In Part IV.A, we discuss
some limitations and hypotheses that we hope will provide a basis for future
research on why taxpayers prefer spending through the tax code. In Part IV.B,
we discuss the implications of our results for tax law and policy.
A. Open Questions and Directions for Future Research
Our results are limited in a few respects. Some of these are general prob-
lems of single-question Internet surveys: for example, our respondents did not
spend hours thinking about these questions. The average response time was
about twenty seconds.112 While this response time in some ways limits infer-
ences about respondents' "true preferences," as discussed below, it also perhaps
captures how some voters actually perceive and evaluate these questions in the
political marketplace. In the context of political advertisements and platforms,
voters do not necessarily spend long periods of time puzzling over the details."3
Nonetheless, a few remaining issues strike us as especially interesting and
relevant for further discussion and research. In this section, we focus on two
possible explanations for why respondents seem to have a stubborn preference
for tax expenditures. First, we discuss the well-known framing effect and why
in. See infra Appendix for more details.
113. For a pessimistic discussion of how voters think, see Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bar-
tels, It Feels Like We're Thinking: The Rationalizing Voter and Electoral Democracy,
Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (Aug. 28,
2006), http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/AchenBartelsoii o7/AchenBartelsollio7.pdf
[http://perma.cc/30LE-SCWU]. One might worry that the immediate reward that survey-
takers get from finishing the survey (access to desired Internet content) may skew responses
even compared to actual voters who make decisions under the hectic constraints of real life.
However, this skew is probably not too severe given that GCS performed comparably to
traditional surveys that lack this instant gratification feature.
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it might exist here. Second, we discuss possible reasons for why a "rational citi-
zen" or "rational voter" might prefer to channel spending programs through
the tax code. While we are ultimately skeptical about these latter explanations,
we think they are important to discuss alongside our results.
1. Why Would a Framing Effect Exist?
As described above," 4 there is a large literature in psychology, economics,
and political science attempting to clarify how the framing of a decision affects
responses. If one takes the view that a dollar spent inside the tax code is func-
tionally equivalent to a dollar spent outside of it, then our results support the
existence of a framing effect in this context.
Our results suggest that taxpayers prefer tax expenditures in part because
they perceive them to be less expensive for the public fisc. Our respondents felt
that direct spending programs increased the deficit more substantially than
equivalent tax expenditures, even though the explicit cost was the same. The other
side of this coin is that our respondents were more likely to prefer receiving a
dollar of cash over a dollar of tax relief because they perceive a dollar of cash to be
more valuable, even when we subtly emphasized that they are the same (for ex-
ample, in Question 13).
This fits our intuitions-and the scholarly literature- about how citizens
view the tax code. Providing a dollar of tax relief might be viewed as letting a
person keep something she already possesses; some citizens might not even re-
alize that they are in fact receiving a benefit from a government policy."'5 This
taps into an intuitive and common-though, in many ways problematic-
assumption about the nature of taxation and government, in which one's "pre-
tax income" represents a natural state of justice that precedes government in-
tervention. We think this view is somewhat misguided: after all, one's pre-tax
income depends crucially on a system of public order that could not exist with-
out government intervention (and, hence, taxation). But the view of pre-tax
income as naturally just is commonly held."
6
This theory has a subtle connection to the first studies of the framing effect,
in which respondents preferred a triage policy that emphasized the lives saved
114. See supra notes 47-54.
iiS. See Suzanne Mettler, Reconstituting the Submerged State: The Challenges of Social Policy Reform
in the Obama Era, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 803, 8o9 (2010) (finding that many recipients of tax ex-
penditures do not even realize that they are benefiting from a government program).
116. See generally LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUS-
TICE 15 (2002) (describing and disputing this "everyday libertarianism" view); Lawrence
Zelenak, The Myth of Pretax Income, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2261 (2003) (reviewing MuRPHY &
NAGEL, supra).
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rather than lives lost, even if the totals were the same.1 7 Likewise, we find it
plausible that respondents prefer policies that let citizens keep their own hard-
earned money to those that give citizens benefits from an amorphous govern-
ment larder.
We think that this view likely explains much of the framing effect we wit-
ness here. We also think that teasing apart these explanations more directly
would be a valuable direction for future research.
2. Can Rational Voters Prefer Tax Expenditures?
An assumption of our paper is that tax expenditures and direct outlays of
equivalent size are, in fact, equivalent. But we do not (and cannot) eliminate
every possible reason why a "rational" voter might prefer tax expenditures to
direct outlays.
That said, we do attempt to rule out some of these alternative explanations.
For example, it could be that voters view tax expenditures as more politically
stable or permanent. Zelinsky, for example, raises this prospect when he notes
that a tax expenditure, "if embedded in a permanent tax code, may be more se-
cure politically than a cash payment, which must be appropriated annually.""
While we think this is plausible, we are unconvinced that political stability ex-
plains a large proportion of the apparent framing effect. The results from our
later waves of survey questions-which included a question emphasizing that
both the tax expenditure and the direct outlay are "one-time" only- still dis-
play a robust framing effect.
Alternatively, it could be the case that voters and policymakers view spend-
ing through the tax system as less amenable to "regulatory capture" than a pro-
gram administered by a specialist agency that interacts repeatedly with a specif-
ic part of the economy."' While we have not tested this hypothesis, we think it
unlikely that aversion to regulatory capture explains a large proportion of the
apparent framing effect. Details of tax and spending administration are not
particularly salient to the public, 2 ' and we think it improbable that most tax-
payers respond on the basis of a difference in program administration-much
117. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 50.
i18. Zelinsky, supra note 25, at 814.
iig. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Proce-
dural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993) (arguing that
there are valid procedural reasons related to interest group capture for promoting public
spending through the tax code).
i2o. See HowARD, supra note 21, at 3 ("[T]ax expenditures ... are largely invisible to citizens,
policy makers, and academics ....").
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less a difference in the likelihood of capture based on the administrative
scheme.
Finally, spending through the tax code might be preferred based on how
voters evaluate a tradeoff between specialization and coordination. If voters
think that certain spending activities are most efficiently clustered together in
the tax system, then they will prefer tax expenditures over direct outlays."'
However, given the simplicity of the programs that we proposed in our exper-
iment, we find it unlikely that this last explanation plays a role in explaining
our responses.
We should note one element of our results that we think can be explained
by rational behavior: the questions about mortgage interest showed the widest
gap between the proposed direct spending program and existing spending
routed through the Code, and there are many plausible explanations for these
results. We felt it important to ask these questions because they deal with one
of the best-known tax expenditures. Because the mortgage deduction is an ex-
isting program, the public's preference for keeping this policy might simply re-
flect a quite rational preference for the status quo -as opposed to switching to
a new and very similar system and incurring related costs. 23 That said, the sta-
tus quo bias cannot explain the entire preference for spending through the
Code, since the framing effect is seen in responses to questions that propose
hypothetical programs unrelated to the status quo.
B. Implications
Our findings have several implications for tax law and the debate over tax
expenditures, and we discuss these implications here.
121. For more on these questions, see Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 24, at 961. Weisbach and
Nussim argue that routing spending programs through the tax code makes sense when
there is significant overlap between the information the IRS will need anyway and the in-
formation needed to administer the program in question -like, for example, the earned in-
come tax credit. Id. at lool. On the other hand, for other programs, like food stamps, there
is little overlap in required information, and there might be other problems with IRS ad-
ministration (for example, if payments need to be made more than once a year). Id. at OO6-
07. Therefore, the program should be directly administered by an agency.
122. Indeed, Weisbach and Nussim argue that their theory of tax expenditures is novel and that
Americans have likely not begun to consider broadly the specialization-versus-coordination
tradeoff when considering spending through the Code. See id. at 957.
123. See the discussion of potential status quo bias supra Part I.D.2.
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1. Economic and Welfare Implications
One set of implications concerns public welfare. Indeed, the framing effect
raises a question that appears frequently in behavioral economics: how can we
evaluate the welfare consequences of seemingly irrational public preferences?
If the arguments in Part IV.A.2 are correct, then taxpayers are not rational
in the manner predicted by classical economics: they should not prefer a dollar
of tax spending to a dollar of direct spending. Public support and public wel-
fare should be the same in both cases -but we show that this does not hold
true.
Might public welfare remain the same, even if public preferences are sus-
ceptible to the framing effect? Some argue that this might be the case.
Weisbach and Nussim, for example, suggest that outcome equivalence implies
welfare equivalence. 4 In other words, the welfare effect- that is, the effect on
utility-of a $1ooo check should be the same as the welfare effect of a $iooo tax
credit, even if the public says it prefers one over the other. 2 But our results
suggest that welfare equivalence does not necessarily hold true: people may re-
act differently if they receive the same $1ooo in a different manner (having
their taxes reduced as opposed to paying the higher tax and receiving a $1ooo
check).
These results showing the framing effect are nonetheless hard to interpret.
Indeed, some scholars have concluded that this kind of "equivalency framing,"
in which two identical options receive different levels of support depending on
how they are described, renders preferences "uninterpretable. ",26 Nonetheless,
in studying the potential divergence between public welfare and public prefer-
ences, we contribute to the growing interest in interpreting the welfare impli-
cations of behavioral economics."'
124. Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 24, at 958 ("Welfare is the same regardless of whether the
program is formally part of the tax system or is located somewhere else in the govern-
ment.").
125. See id.
126. For a rich discussion of this point, see Druckman, supra note 54, at 234 ("The implication is
that equivalency framing effects render peoples' preferences uninterpretable. For example,
when people prefer an economic program described as resulting in 95% employment but
then oppose the same program when told that it will result in 5% unemployment, it is im-
possible to determine if they support or oppose the program (i.e., the preferences are irrec-
oncilable).").
127. See B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic
Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics, 124 Q.J. ECON. 51 (2009); see also Jacob
Goldin & Daniel Reck, Preference Identification Under Inconsistent Choice: A Reduced-
Form Approach (Working Paper), http://ssrn.com/abstract=24177o9 [http://perma.cc
/RA9F-F2YW].
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2. Implications for Trends in Tax Law
Perhaps more centrally, our results also have implications for a longstand-
ing debate in tax law and policy: why have tax expenditures continued to in-
crease, despite repeated efforts to expose and restrain their cost? Since Surrey's
original writings on the subject, there has been a concerted effort at both the
federal and state levels to make tax expenditures a more public part of the
budgeting process -in other words, to make sure that policymakers are forced
to publicly account for their spending through the tax code.128 According to
some recent critics, however, these efforts have failed to slow the growth of tax
expenditures. 29
There have been several prominent efforts to address this apparent para-
dox. 3° One line of analysis emphasizes that, but for the budgeting require-
ments, the growth rate of tax expenditures would have been "even more ro-
bust." 1' Another argues that efforts to publicize tax expenditures have so far
been meek and ineffective. Edward Kleinbard, for example, has argued that the
current federal tax expenditure budgeting scheme "is expressly designed to
avoid leaving any visible imprint on the budget, and the programs so favored
have not been forced to compete with other spending programs for scarce Gov-
ernment resources in other committees or among the members as a whole."'32
A third line of analysis, favored by Edward Zelinsky, argues that tax expendi-
ture budgeting "legitimates tax expenditures and encourages a scramble
[among interest groups] for parity in the form of comparable tax benefits."'33
Our results have implications for the debate over why tax expenditures
have continued to grow. In particular, we show that there is likely to be more
demand for spending through the tax code even if more transparent "budget-
ing" or "disclosure" takes place. A major constraint on a legislator's willingness
to enact new spending measures is the way in which new policies will be
viewed by constituents - and, naturally, politicians running for elected office
have incentives to propose policies and frame policies in a manner that appeals
128. See Zelinsky, supra note ii, at 3-4.
129. See generally Zelinsky, supra note ii. Of course, it might be the case that the growth in tax
expenditures would, but for tax expenditure budgets, be much worse. But it is difficult to
imagine a kind of randomized experiment that could test this proposition.
13o. The contours of this debate are outlined in Zelinsky, supra note ii.
131. J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its In-
ternational Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REv. 437, 524 (2008).
132. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures Distort
Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2010).
133. Zelinsky, supra note ii, at 5.
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to the median voter. Our results suggest that constituents may view tax ex-
penditures more positively than general outlays, and this in turn suggests that
the scales might always be tilted in favor of spending measures that flow
through the tax code."3
Spending through the tax code is what Chong and Druckman refer to as a
"strong frame": a frame that "emerge[s] from public discussion as the best ra-
tionale[] for contending positions on the issue." 3 Since the "typical political
strategy is to connect a proposal to a positive idea or value that is widely availa-
ble in the population,",, 6 we believe that the basic and stable public bias in fa-
vor of spending through the tax code helps to explain the enormous rise of tax
expenditures.
3. The Perverse Effects of Existing Tax Expenditure Budgets
A powerful tradition of legal thought suggests that transparency is normal-
ly good (or, in Justice Brandeis's memorable phrase, that sunlight is the best
disinfectant'37). Likewise, the emphasis of the conversation on tax expenditures
has been about making them more transparent through a process of tax ex-
penditure budgeting." 8 The thought is simple: "[I]f policymakers, the media,
and the general public lack information about tax expenditures, they cannot
fully participate in decisions about how to allocate state resources."' 39
134. This does not mean that we should expect that all direct spending will be routed through
the tax code. For the reasons that Weisbach and Nussim outline, it may be impractical or
very costly to route some programs, such as food stamps, through the tax code. Therefore,
these programs are not administered as tax expenditures, even if they would be more popu-
lar if they were. See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 24, at 997-1027 (explaining why the
Earned Income Tax Credit, unlike food stamps, is best administered as a tax expenditure).
135. Chong & Druckman, supra note 54, at 116.
136. Id.
137. Louis D. BRANDEIS, What Publicity Can Do, in OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE
BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914) ("Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and indus-
trial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman.").
138. See, e.g., Jon Craig & William Allan, Fiscal Transparency, Tax Expenditures, and Budget Pro-
cesses: An International Perspective, 94 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX'N & MINUTES ANN. MEET-
ING NAT'L TAX ASS'N 258 (2001); see also TAX EXPENDITURES - SHEDDING LIGHT ON Gov-
ERNMENT SPENDING THROUGH THE TAX SYSTEM (Hana Polackova Brixi et al. eds., 2004)
(describing lessons from developed and transition countries for the transparent use of tax
expenditures).
139. JASON LEVITIS ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, PROMOTING STATE BUDGETAC-
COUNTABILITY THROUGH TAX EXPENDITURE REPORTING 1 (2009).
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The question of when and how to give the public information about tax
expenditures is very much alive. Tax transparency is a perennial subject of the
policy debate,'140 and the tax expenditure budgets are becoming increasingly
common. The federal government is required to produce an annual tax ex-
penditure report, as are most states."' While tax expenditures still typically re-
ceive less scrutiny than direct spending, 4 2 the trend continues to favor more
disclosure about tax expenditures. In some states, like Connecticut 43 and Min-
nesota,' 44 the reporting requirements and publications are extensive. Further-
more, as of 2011, only four states did not require some form of tax expenditure
report, falling from nine in 2009.1
4 .
This trend toward tax expenditure budgeting and related transparency is
usually viewed as beneficial. As the Joint Committee on Taxation recently put
it, "[t]ax expenditure analysis can help both policymakers and the public to
understand the actual size of government, the uses to which government re-
sources are put, and the tax and economic policy consequences that follow
from the implicit or explicit choices made in fashioning legislation." 6 Yet de-
spite the enthusiasm for tax expenditure disclosure, the growth of tax spending
has eclipsed the growth of government spending as a whole. 47
Our results suggest that recent efforts to expose the true costs of tax ex-
penditures can be ineffective and perhaps even counterproductive. In broad
140. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax: Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25
OHIO N.U. L. REV. l1, 104 (1999) ("The efforts to date are not encouraging from the
standpoint of transparency.").
141. See supra notes io-l1 and accompanying text.
142. See LEVITIS ET AL., supra note 139, at 1 ("States typically require extensive documentation of
how much direct spending they do each year, and their budget processes entail evaluation of
each item. Tax expenditures usually receive far less scrutiny.").
143. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 12-7b(e) (West 2014); see also Office of Fiscal Analysis,, Con-
necticut Tax Expenditure Report, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY (2012), http://www.cga.ct.gov/ofa
/Documents/year/TER/2o 12TER-20 120410_Tax%2oExpenditure%2oReport%20FY%2012
%2oRevised.pdf [http://perma.cc/CsVL-CJDH].
144. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 27oC.11 (West 2014); see also Tax Research Div.,, State of Minnesota
Tax Expenditure Budget: Fiscal Years 2012-2015, MINN. DEP'T REVENUE (2012), http://www
.revenue.state.mn.us/research-stats/research-reports/2o12/2o12_tax-expenditure links.pdf
[http://perma.cc/45VX-EMAZ].
145. See Leachman, Grundman &Johnson, supra note 11, at 38-44. For the 2009 data, see Michael
Leachman, Nicholas Johnson & Jeremy Koulish, Promoting State Budget Accountability
Through Tax Expenditure Reporting, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 3 (Apr. 2009),
http ://www.cbpp.org/files/4-9-o9sfp.pdf [http://perma.cc/SNU9-GPN8].
146. STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FED. TAX EXPENDITURES
FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017, at i (Comm. Print 2013).
147. See generally The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014-2024, supra note 8 (discussing the
growth rate of both tax expenditures and total government expenditures).
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strokes, existing efforts to disclose tax expenditures might have two effects.
First, they might make the public more aware of the general equivalence be-
tween taxing and spending programs, and perhaps as intended, educate the
public on the true costs of tax expenditures. Second, however, efforts to dis-
close tax expenditures might make the public think more about how the budg-
et is organized and thereby normalize the broad range of policies that are orga-
nized through the tax code. This normalization in turn may make it seem
perfectly appropriate to use tax expenditures to implement a new social benefit
scheme in the future, whereas, without the additional information, tax expend-
itures seemed unusual and only appropriate in specific areas. ' 8
If such normalization occurs, we should expect it to increase both the rela-
tive spending on tax expenditures and total spending. Relative spending in-
creases because legislatures, responding to public preferences, substitute
spending through the tax code for direct spending. Absolute spending increas-
es because the public thinks spending through the tax code is spending on the
cheap."49 Therefore, if the public consistently prefers spending through the tax
code-even if the public has more information about the equivalence between
that spending and direct outlays -providing more information about the size
and prevalence of tax expenditures might actually make tax expenditures more
popular.
Our results do suggest that the framing effect is relatively robust to addi-
tional information- that is, in our survey the framing effect persisted even
when we provided additional information. People's opinions did not change
when they were given clear information about the mechanics of the tax ex-
penditure. Even when respondents were given explicit information about the
cost of the program- exactly the type of information that they would see in a
tax expenditure budget -they continued to think that tax expenditures should
be classified as less expensive. 5
148. This idea is similar to Zelinsky's point that tax expenditure budgeting might counterpro-
ductively "encourage[] a scramble [among interest groups] for parity in the form of compa-
rable tax benefits." Zelinsky, supra note ii, at S. But instead of emphasizing the desires of
special interests, we suggest that budgeting might also affect the public directly by making
citizens aware of the many forms that tax expenditures can take. Likewise, while Ha-
selswerdt and Bartels do not talk about tax expenditure budgeting, this idea also reflects
their belief that when people are more familiar with government support coming through
tax expenditures in a given policy area, they are more likely to support future use of tax ex-
penditures in that area. Haselswerdt & Barrels, supra note 42 (manuscript at 6-7).
149. This idea follows the well-known income and substitution effects in microeconomic theory.
For a discussion of these effects, see ROBERT E. HALL & MARC LIEBERMAN, MICROECONOM-
ICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 161-65 (6th ed. 2013).
iso. In addition, we also find evidence that, despite widespread tax-expenditure budgeting, the
term has little meaning to the public.
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More information might help. People who spend a lot of time thinking
about the equivalence of tax expenditures and direct outlays-like tax profes-
sors and other well-informed tax mavens - are probably less likely to care about
the frame. But what our results do show is that the type of information typical-
ly disclosed in tax expenditure budgets does not have much effect on the pub-
lic's preference for tax expenditures. This isn't necessarily a bad thing; it might
simply mean that the public is getting more of what it wants and that people
are happier as a result. But the public's stubborn preference for tax breaks does
suggest that if the modern-day Surreys want to press their campaign against
tax expenditures, they might want to consider a different approach.
In some ways, the notion that tax expenditure budgets might normalize tax
expenditures should not be surprising: it connects to a growing literature that
is skeptical of whether mandatory disclosure will always help.'5 ' Disclosing
CEO salaries, for example - a step intended to shame companies away from ex-
cessive compensation packages and curb agency problems -might actually in-
crease the overall level of CEO pay, since it makes price competition for CEOs
all the more explicit, and CEOs likely want to be paid more than average.'52
Likewise, informing employees of their coworkers' salaries might reduce job
satisfaction, since no one wants to get paid less than the median employee.'- 3
The transparency of medical prices could, in some instances, increase medical
costs, since no one wants to pay for a cheaper than average surgeon.' 4 Like-
wise, publicly documenting the popularity of tax expenditures might have the
effect of making tax expenditures more popular.
4. Implications for Tax Complexity
The public's stubborn preference for tax expenditures may also help ex-
plain another much-derided feature of tax policy that has frustrated many
scholars: tax complexity. A public bias in favor of spending through the tax
151. See, e.g., Justin Fox, Government Transparency and Policymaking, 131 PUB. CHOICE 23 (2007).
152. Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Executive Superstars, Peer Groups, and Overcompensa-
tion: Cause, Effect, and Solution, 38 J. CoRr. L. 487 (2013); see also James Surowiecki, Open
Season, NEw YORKER, Oct. 21, 2013, http://www.newyorker.cof/talk/financial/2oi3/1o/21
/131o21ta talk surowiecki [http://perma.cc/8WK2-GMFQJ ("[T]he drive for transparency
has actually helped fuel the spiraling salaries [of executives].").
153. See David Card et al., Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM.
ECON. REv. 2981 (2012).
154. Peter Ubel, How Price Transparency Could End Up Increasing Health-Care Costs,
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code is an overlooked explanation for why the tax code has become so complex.
Typical explanations for tax complexity focus on interest group pressure, tax
fairness, and tax fraud reduction. 5 But a robust public predisposition for
spending through the tax code -combined with an electoral system in which
politicians are motivated to pursue policies and framing that appeal to the me-
dian voter -also adds to the confusion of the tax system.
When ordinary taxpayers confront their taxes, the most complex items they
deal with are generally tax expenditures. For salaried or wage employees, calcu-
lating gross income is relatively easy: enter your W-2 and, if you have any in-
vestments, take the income figures from the 1099 provided by your broker or
financial institution. On the other hand, calculating deductions and credits is
much trickier. A few relevant deductions are expenses related to earning taxa-
ble income., 6 But the rest are tax expenditures: the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, deduction for state and local taxes, mortgage insurance deduction, the
EITC, the adoption credit, the child tax credit, the "astonishingly complex
credits designed to offset the cost of college tuition," 715 the charitable donation
deduction, retirement accounts-the list goes on. The IRS estimates that the
average individual spends eight hours on their taxes each year, between record
keeping and actually filing. s8 We think it is likely that the vast majority of this
time is spent dealing with eligibility for tax expenditures. 1 9 Taxpayers' prefer-
ence for spending through the tax code is thus part of what drives 84% of
Americans to call the federal tax system complex. 6o
155. See, e.g., Deborah L. Paul, The Sources of Tax Complexity: How Much Simplicity Can Funda-
mental Tax Reform Achieve?, 76 N.C. L. REv. 151 (1997).
156. For example, expenses incurred while moving to a new job.
17. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 429 (6th ed. 2008).
158. See Notices, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/instructions/io4o/aro3.html [http://perma.cc/3KKG
-REFS].
159. The standard deduction is designed to insulate many taxpayers from the hassles of dealing
with these issues, but even non-itemizers must deal with credits of various kinds and the
rules surrounding retirement accounts if they have one.
16o. See Topline Results for Tax Foundation's 2009 Survey of U.S. Attitudes on Taxes,
Government Spending and Wealth Distribution, TAX FOuND. (Apr. 8, 2009), http://
taxfoundation.org/article/topline-results-tax-foundations-2oo9-survey-us-attitudes-taxes
-government-spending-and-wealth [http://perma.cc/BZsU-CTQI ]. Of course, even if the
tax expenditures were instead direct outlays, a different government agency would need to
determine eligibility and administer them, perhaps leading to equal aggravation for citizens.
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CONCLUSION
Tax expenditures are an important part of government spending. As noted
above, the CBO estimates that federal tax expenditures will be $1.4 trillion in
the 2014 fiscal year.16, If total spending is higher because (all else being equal)
citizens have a persistent and systematic bias in favor of spending through the
tax code, then billions of dollars are at stake. For example, if tax expenditures
are a mere 2% higher because of greater public support for spending through
the Code, then this $28 billion would be as much money as the President's
proposed energy budget (including clean energy initiatives -$28.4 billion)
6,
or the entire budget of the DOJ (including federal prisons and the FBI - $27
billion).163
Are citizens competent to make these important decisions of tax policy and
public spending? A relatively uncontroversial feature of democratic theory is
that the government should be responsive to citizen preferences. But this sug-
gests an analogous conclusion, discussed at some length in the political science
literature: in order for government to be responsive to citizen preferences, citi-
zens must be capable offorming preferences. 64
What does it mean for citizens to be capable of forming competent prefer-
ences? Some political scientists argue that competent preferences "should not
be based on arbitrary aspects of how an issue or problem is described", - a
criterion that resembles the well-known "independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives" condition in the social choice literature. 66 But when framing effects
cause the public to respond differently to equivalent proposals, the democratic
competence of the citizenry may be thrown into doubt. 167
This problem is different from one that is often raised in analyses of the
public's relationship to the tax system. Often, the emphasis is on public igno-
rance of the mechanics of tax administration. 16 But the framing effect creates a
161. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2014-2024, supra note 8, at 90.
162. Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2014, OFF. MGMT.
& BUDGET 85 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2o1 4
/assets/budget.pdf [http://perma.cc/62SC-VX68].
163. Id. at 119.
164. See Druckman supra note 54, at 232-33.
165. Id. at 232.
166. See KENNETH J. ARROw, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 26 (2d ed. 1970).
167. See Chong & Druckman, supra note 54, at 121-22.
168. Sheffrin, for instance, writes that the "tax system is one of our most complex social contriv-
ances and, realistically, one can only expect there to be limited knowledge about it."
Sheffrin, supra note 30, at 311.
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different worry. It suggests that even if the public were much more fully aware
of how the tax system works, public preferences would still be susceptible to
"arbitrary" changes in wording and frames.
Frames are, of course, an inevitable feature of life. But they are an underap-
preciated part of the ways in which tax law and policy have been shaped over
the last several decades. Much of academic and policy focus has been on publi-
cizing the details and cost of our tax policy choices. But our analysis here sug-
gests this emphasis is incomplete. However worthy those efforts may be, they
run up against the stable and enduring public bias in favor of pursuing policies
through the tax code.
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APPENDIX
As discussed in the body of the Note, Google Consumer Survey (GCS) is a
"survey wall" that pops up when users want to access premium content, much
like a paywall. GCS is used by "130 publishers in the U.S." including "[t]hree
of the top lo newspapers, seven of the top 15 .• sites like the New York Daily
News, Christian Science Monitor, and.., the LA Times.", 6' The network also
includes small news sites like Lima, Ohio News and the Texas Tribune as well
as Pandora and YouTube, and various other arts and entertainment sites.170
Visitors to these sites cannot opt into the surveys. Instead, they are solicited
using a model that is designed to ensure a representative sample. The algo-
rithm over-samples groups that are currently underrepresented in the sample.
That is, if, say, women aged 18-24 from the South were underrepresented in
the sample relative to the portion of the underlying Internet-using population
they make up (as measured by the Census' Current Population Survey), then
that group would receive proportionally more survey requests. 7' This is known
as stratified sampling, but GCS's ability to receive responses in real time makes
it different from traditional stratified methods where the stratification (that is,
the issue of which groups are over sampled) is set before the survey begins.
The screenshot on the following page, displaying Question io, shows how
one of our questions would show up. The order in which the answers are dis-
played is randomized (that is, the "Yes" option will show up after "No" as of-
ten as before "No").
169. Steve Cooper, Q&A with Paul McDonald: Co-Creator of Google Consumer Surveys,
FORBES, Mar. 29, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevecooper/2o13/o3/29/qa-with-paul
-mcdonald-co-creator-of-google-consumer-surveys [http ://perma.cc/485U-BNWD].
170. Keeter & Christian, supra note 91, at 3.
17. See id.; McDonald et al., supra note 78, at 3-4.
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Taking Question io as an example, the image below shows the distribution
of how long participants took to respond to the question.
On average, participants took thirty-six seconds. Excluding participants
who took more than two minutes to respond, the average response time was
twenty seconds. There does not appear to be any binding upper time limit.
One respondent took fifty-four minutes to respond (though we doubt that
he was lost in thought about tax expenditures the whole time).
F~I
